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Abstract 
The role of Microfinance in alleviating poverty and enhancing social development is increasing. 
However, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) suffer from two important problems which undermine 
their growth. The first one is inherent to their exposure to information asymmetry (adverse selection 
and moral hazard). The second one is related to the higher cost of debt enforcement especially in the 
developing countries where they are generally operating. The problem of costly monitoring is also 
faced by Islamic Microfinance Institutions (IMFIs) and becomes more important in the case of Profit 
and Loss Sharing contracts. This paper provides a literature survey about the best practices of the 
MFIs in term of monitoring, discusses their relevance to the IMFIs, and explores the development of 
specific regulatory and institutional mechanisms to enhance the performance of different schemes of 
Islamic micro lending programs. It comes up with a number of policy recommendations (for policy 
makers and managers of the microfinance institutions) detailing the directions of enhancing the 
regulatory and institutional environment for the sustainable growth of the Islamic microfinance 
industry in the OIC countries. 
Keywords: Islamic microfinance, information asymmetry, monitoring costs, regulation and 
supervision.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the global financial crisis, global unemployment has increased to record 197 million job seekers 
worldwide in 2011, where 74.7 million are youth unemployed. Upward trends in both the adult and 
youth unemployment make estimates possible to reach 202 million in 20134. The MENA region has to 
create up to 70 million jobs by 2020 to match the global employment rate’s pattern5. The OIC6 
member countries, with a population of 1.57 billion people, displayed important unemployment rate 
(9.4% in 2010)
7
 which exceeds the global rate (6% in 2011). North African countries, which have 
strong direct trading and migration ties with the EU countries, have suffered from return migration 
from Southern Europe, leading to deeper stress to their labor markets. The lack of employment 
opportunities is the strike problems these countries are facing, due to demographic growth, skills 
mismatches, the rigidity of the labor markets, and the weakness of the private sector. In 2012, the 
female youth unemployment rate was estimated to 37%, six times more than the rate of adult men
8
. In 
the Middle Eastern countries, the unemployment rate varies cross-countries. In one hand, the 
economic growth of oil exporting economies (like Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) exceeded 
6% in 2012, and unemployment rates were low (0.5% in Qatar and 2.7% in Kuwait), except for 
countries where stability is not preserved such as Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, oil importing 
countries are struggling with low levels of economic growth, and double-digit unemployment rates
9
.  
Among the 192 member countries of the United Nation, over 130 of them are classified as developing 
countries which are in general not only facing high unemployment but also high rates of poverty. According to 
estimates by the World Bank, more than 1.6 billion people were classified as poor in 2009, with the 
majority of them live in rural areas. In Middle East, 30.2% of the total population was either poor or 
near poor
10
 in 2011, a medium percentage compared with the global rate in developing world, 58.4%, 
while it reaches 61.1% in North Africa and 92% in South Asia. Following the success of the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh, microfinance has been considered to be a new financial model for poverty 
alleviation in developing countries. In 2006, Grameen Bank and its founder Mohamed Yunus were 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “their efforts to create economic and social development from 
below”11. The idea was as simple: giving the poor the chance to become micro entrepreneur, and thus 
improve their social performance, by providing them small loans repaid after investment return 
generation. These loans are expected to be used for self-employment and income-generating activities.  
The global microfinance industry showed, during the last decade, a remarkable growth of around 20%, 
coming mainly from South and East Asia, and Africa
12
. However, the current outreach of microfinance 
remains insufficient, especially in the rural areas of the developing countries. In OIC member 
countries, microfinance is predominantly urban, except in Indonesia which displays more than 105 
micro and rural banks in 2007
13
. The value of global Islamic finance assets has rose from only $US80 
billion in 2000 to 1.1 trillion USD in 2011
14
. Although it is growing rapidly, the overall supply of 
Islamic microfinance products is considered as small compared to the conventional microfinance 
sector. Islamic microfinance presents less than 1% of global microfinance programs. The estimated 
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total number of poor clients using Shariah-compliant products is about 1.28 million, while there are 
only 255 financial service providers offering Shariah-compatible microfinance products and services 
worldwide (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013). According to Karim, Tarazi and Reille (2008) 20% to 60% 
of the population in various Muslim countries displayed potential demand to access Islamic finance. 
As 72% of people in Muslim countries do not use formal financial services
15
, Islamic microfinance has 
great potential to contribute to alleviating poverty and enhancing development, but it faces a lot of 
challenges, all together.  
Different factors are at the origin of the weak level of development of Islamic microfinance in the OIC 
countries. First, there is lack of harmonization of the institutional environment and regulations for the 
supply of Shariah-compliant products. Most central banks of OIC countries have not yet incorporated 
Islamic microfinance category in their regulatory and accounting framework. Except some countries in 
MENA region (Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen), the rest of the OIC countries have not tailored 
specific legislation even for the microfinance institutions in general conventional and Islamic. 
Therefore, in most cases, Islamic Microfinance Institutions (IMFIs) have to comply with conventional 
regulations which may not be adapted to their business. In addition, the high costs of enforcement 
contracts discourage lenders from engaging in contractual arrangements. According to a report made 
by the SESRIC
16
 in 2012, the average cost of enforcing contracts in the OIC countries, as a percentage 
of claim value was equal to 38.8% in 2011, much than the 20.2% of the Developed countries and the 
34.7% at the global level. Another challenge is the lack, in the conventional microfinance institutions, 
of trained staff capable to master Islamic finance concepts and products. Besides, there are insufficient 
theoretical and policy oriented research that can be relied by potential investors in Islamic 
Microfinance services industry.   
The primarily goal of this research is to present a comprehensive study on the challenges and 
opportunities of the Islamic microfinance industry. The paper provides an extensive review of the 
literature on the efficiency of microcredit schemes, with a focus on their institutional viability, 
regulatory environment and sustainability. We also examine the best practices of some Islamic 
Microfinance products by presenting best practices of some Islamic Microfinance Institutions, in term 
of monitoring their clients. The ultimate objective is to identify the best practices that can benefit for 
Islamic microfinance institutions development. We believe that having a good understanding of the 
environment of the IMFIs is perquisite to enhance the enforceability of the existing Islamic 
microfinance contracts and favors the development of new products that overcome inherent issues.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: The first section discusses the regulatory and supervisory 
environments of microfinance in OIC countries. The second section is devoted to a review of the 
existing literature on the monitoring mechanisms of micro lending programs. The features of Islamic 
Microfinance practices and the performance of different schemes of Islamic micro lending programs 
are examined in the third section. In the final section, we present and analyze the main challenges and 
opportunities of Islamic microfinance and we introduce a set of policy recommendations, forwarded to 
regulatory authorities and to decision makers in IMFIs, which can contribute in enhancing the 
development of the IMF industry. The conclusion summarizes the major findings.                                               
II. OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ENVIRONMENT OF 
MICROFINANCE SECTOR IN OIC COUNTRIES  
This section provides an analysis of the institutional and regulatory environment of the Microfinance 
sector in some of the OIC countries based on the Global microscope on the microfinance business 
environment, 2012 database. Our analyses stem from earlier study of Ahlin et al. (2010), which found 
that MFI performance depends largely on the country macro and micro-institutional context. The 
sampled 1106 MFIs (Banks, Credit and Saving Cooperatives, Non-Governmental organization (NGO) 
and Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI)) operate in 55 different countries.  
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Table 1. Categorization of sampled MFIs by region  
Geographical Area # of 
countries 
# of MFIs 
Africa 11 197 
East Asia 7 148 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 7 104 
Latin America and the Caribbean 21 411 
Middle East and North Africa 4 33 
South Asia 5 213 
TOTAL 55 1106 
 
Geographically, most of the MFIs are based in Latin America and the Caribbean (37.16%), whilst the 
MFIs in South Asia and MENA regions represent 22.24% each of the sample. Although it includes a 
large number of MFIs, the sample cannot be considered fully statistically relevant as it does not 
include several MFIs from other countries. The data is summarized and defined is Table 2 (see 
Appendix 2.A). It includes three distinct categories: Regulatory Framework and Practice, 
Supporting Institutional Environment and Adjustment Stability Factor. The Return on Assets 
(ROA) is a measure of MFIs’ Performance as it indicates how well the institution’s assets are used to 
generate income. Besides Portfolio size, Y-O-Y growth in number of borrowers and Growth on Gross 
Loan Portfolio indicate MFIs’ Outreach. MFIs’ Efficiency is measured by Cost per loan, Borrowers 
per staff members and Cost per borrower.  
The Global microscope on the microfinance business environment, 2012 database provides also two 
indicators to measure MFIs’ Risk: Portfolio at Risk (PAR-30) and Write-offs percentage. Each 
category’s score is calculated as the weighted sum of indicators in that category. Overall Score is, the 
weighted sum of the Regulatory and Practice and Supporting Institutional Environment, reduced by 
the Adjustment Factor, and it indicates the overall situation of the microfinance sector in the country, 
in relation to specific economic indicators and law regulations. The Regulatory Framework and 
Practice and Supporting Institutional Environment categories are each weighted 50%. 
II.1. Regulatory and Institutional Environment  
The issue of regulation and supervision has been one of the core interests of researchers especially 
during and following the crisis periods. This interest is mainly due to the well-known information 
asymmetry between shareholders and depositors which arise due to agency problems (Stiglitz, 1994). 
Insiders (managers and owners) have informational advantage over outsiders (depositors and 
creditors) which lead to a conflict of interests. Banks may act in favor of insiders by increasing the 
expected return for shareholders regardless of the interest of depositors. In addition, spillover effects 
often exist when an opportunistic behavior of a single institution hampers the safety and viability of all 
the financial institutions. To prevent these risks, government imposes prudential regulations with the 
objective to control interest rates and restrict opportunistic activities, and to protect depositors’ rights. 
In developing countries, economies have dropped prudential regulations to concentrate mainly on 
capital requirements and supervisory control through onsite and offsite monitoring (Arun and Turner, 
2002). But monitoring is hard to practice in poor institutional environment due to the lack of well 
qualified and trained personnel and inefficiency of legislative and accounting systems.  
These issues have been also raised in the microfinance sector. Researchers who defend the importance 
of regulations in the microfinance sector argue that MFIs use innovative products and models that 
generate high operating costs and it is too risky not to regulate them. In case of default, commercial 
banks that fund MFIs are more likely to be affected and systematic risk may arise. Regulation and 
supervision are costly to implement, especially for small financial institutions. However, the benefits 
of regulations may overcome problems of higher costs (Theodore & Loubiere, 2002). 
5 
 
Other studies proved otherwise. For instance, Steel and Andah (2003) conduct a study in Ghana and 
find that the costs of regulations and supervision overcome its benefits. Their findings are consistent 
with a CGAP (2002) study which estimates that the cost of supervision presents 5% of total costs in 
the first year and 1% in the following years. 
Figure 1. Regulatory environment in some OIC Countries 
 
MFIs in different OIC-countries operate under the existing legal and regulatory framework. Most of 
them are registered as cooperatives and non-governmental organizations. They do not operate under a 
dedicated financial legal status but in the existing legislations that have been reframed to regulate 
microfinance banks. Cross-country regulations vary according different indicators. Figure 1 and 2 
illustrate the development of the regulatory and institutional environments in some OIC-countries. 
Pakistan has shown to be placed in the first rank (Overall Score 67.4), followed by Uganda (51.6) and 
Indonesia (44.3), while Turkey came at the last (Overall Score 26.6), right after Egypt (Overall Score 
27.4) and Yemen (Overall Score 30.4). 
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Figure 2. Institutional indicators in some OIC Countries 
 
In Pakistan, the development of the microfinance sector has benefited from the government’s strategy 
which resulted in the establishment of an appropriate legal and institutional framework, promoting 
transparency in prices and reports, setting framework for the compliance of MFIs’ accountancy to 
international accounting standards (IFRS standards), requiring external audit requirement, setting an 
effective dispute resolution system, and establishing clients’ protection mechanisms. In 2009, a Code 
of Conduct for Consumer Protection has been developed to protect microfinance clients where 23 
Pakistani MFIs signed ever since. Its main objective is to ensure price transparency. Besides, the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) requires that all microfinance banks should give to their potential clients all 
the information needed about prices, interest fees, and terms and conditions of the contracts. 
Consequently, the number of transactions had risen sharply to reach 20.6 million in 2012 compared to 
only 3.5 million in 2011.  
Since 2005, the government has taken serious initiatives to promote the sustainability of microfinance 
growth by encouraging the market-driven formal system. The “Expanding Outreach of Microfinance” 
national strategy was the culmination of a process of institutional reforms which begun few years ago. 
It was formulated by SBP and declared a target of 3 million borrowers by the end of 2010 and 10 
million by 2015. To reach the target numbers, Pakistani regulatory authorities have encouraged NGO-
MFIs to expand their activities and upscale their status through transformation into MF banks. The 
SBP released the “Transformation Guidelines” to allow non-bank NGO-MFIs, rural support programs 
(RSPs) and cooperatives to transform into regular MFBs. Ever since, a lot of NGOs have up scaled 
and created MFBs (for exemple, Kashf Foundation, the Aga Khan’s RSP). These reforms are expected 
to further enhance the microfinance sector in the country. As a result, weak MFIs can be merged to 
form strong institutions able to provide competitive microfinance services to customers.  
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Figure 3. Political shock to microfinance 
 
In Yemen, despite the political crisis in 2011 (figure 3 shows a high instability score in Yemen 
compared to other countries), microfinance has grown by 0.3% between the year 2011 and 2012 and 
its potential is promising. IFC commissioned market studies show a high demand for Islamic 
microfinance products. In Yemen, 40% of the poor prefer Islamic financial services
17
. According to 
the EIU data, Yemen fell 17 places in the world microfinance ranking, dropping from rank 25 to 45. 
Currently, the microfinance market operates under the “Microfinance Law”, which was established in 
2009. Under such law, MFI Banks are subject to direct supervision from the Central Bank of Yemen 
(CBY), and are required to set a minimum capital of YR500m (US$2.5 million). Besides, the law 
allows NGOs to upgrade to operate as commercial MFI Banks. MFIs NGOs that refuse to upgrade are 
neither supervised by CBY nor required to comply with the capital requirement. Instead, the Social 
Fund for Development (SFD) regulates most of the NGOs. Each NGO must present its monthly set of 
accounts to the SFD. Practically, not all NGOs fulfill this obligation. Besides, some NGOs, which are 
not allowed to do so, provide voluntary saving products to the public. MFIs that want to join the 
Yemen Microfinance Network (YMN) are obliged to provide an audited financial report for at least 
one year. After that, YMN members are asked to submit monthly financial updates. The progress in 
the regulatory process aims to assure the MFIs financial strength in term of profitability ratios, income 
statements, and their other financial indicators. Although it has been voluntary practiced by many 
Yemeni MFIs, price transparency is still not required by law. The National Microfinance Foundation, 
the largest MFI in the country, usually posts information on pricing in its different branches. Another 
concern is the implementation of effective credit bureaus for microfinance. Credit bureaus are weak 
and unreliable to provide necessary information on prospective depositors. Credit Information Index in 
Yemen has been assigned a score of 2 out of 6 by the World Bank. The latter indicates that public 
credit bureau coverage to 0.7% of the adult population, whereas the private registries are absent. The 
regional score is 9.3.
18
 Recently, the central bank announced its intention to introduce a series of laws 
as an add-on to the 2009 Microfinance Law, which would impose requirements on transparency
19
.  
Egypt is characterized by a quite similar context than Yemen, except for the regulatory framework. 
Indeed, the two countries characterized by recent political instability, weak economic situation at the 
country level and poor institutional environment, small agent transaction mechanisms and weak client 
protection at the level of microfinance sector. In Egypt, microfinance is practiced by the national post 
office, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), NGOs, non-bank financial institutions 
(NBIs) and banks. There is no specific law that regulates microfinance institutions as 80% of 
microfinance service providers are NGOs in 2012. Considerable efforts are dedicated to legally frame 
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the informal financial markets. As a result, the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) was 
established in 2009 under the Law for the regulation of non-banking financial markets and 
instruments, to regulate all microfinance activities. The critical overall situation in Egypt has affected 
the microfinance sector. As a result, Egypt global rank dropped from place 42
th
 in 2011 to place 50
th
 
worldwide. Its microfinance institutional framework remains weak mainly due to under performance 
in accounting transparency and client protection system. Serious efforts have to be made to enforce the 
viability of the sector in the country. As a starting point, a plan for microfinance institution network 
needs to be established. Egyptian authority will have to focus on introducing acts of laws to further 
regulate existing MFIs and promoting the implementation of other MFIs’ types, like Microfinance 
Bank, which can assure product diversity and provide a wide range of services to the poor in different 
areas (savings deposits, insurance, pension, money transfer, and other financial services). More than 
400 NGOs operate in the microfinance market in Egypt. Transformation of groups of NGOs into 
microfinance banks and rural banks may redouble their financial resources and allowing extra sources 
of funding (private and governmental). According to the hypothesis of “the lifecycle” of Sousa-Shields 
and Miamidian (2004), MFIs, usually, start as non-profit organizations (like NGOs) which are 
dependent to public subsidies funds. However, these ties may ultimately weaken their financial 
performance (Kailley, 2007). Getting access to deposits and commercial credit funding makes MFIs 
progressively independent from the subsidies. Subsidized MFIs are allowed to keep their status when 
necessary technical assistance is provided in the form of subsidizing investments in infrastructure and 
management information systems for example (Ledgerwood and White, 2006).      
Figure 4. Ranking of some OIC Countries by categories 
 
Morocco is ranked first in the MENA region as it takes priority for accounting transparency and 
imposes a good regulatory disposition in the microfinance sector. More than 95% of total outstanding 
credits are provided by only four MFIs. All these institutions follow the international accounting 
standards (IFRS standards) in their accounting reports and financial statements, with high conformity 
levels
20. Since 2007, the Moroccan Ministry of Finance has established “The Microfinance Chart of 
Accounts”, which includes the financial statements and accounting practices that should be followed 
by the MFIs. However, presently, there is no specific regulatory or legislative system protecting 
microfinance institutions’ clients. All fees and loan terms are not compulsory for MFIs to disclose, and 
interest rate information is not available to the public. When it comes to dispute resolution, the 
ineffectual judicial system makes disputes costly and lengthy to be resolved in an effective way. The 
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country in 2010, declared to have 87% conformity with the IFRS standards.   
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lack of transparency and weak judicial system are the two main obstacles facing the microfinance 
institutions’ credibility and sustainability. 
In Uganda, despite the political turbulence in the country, microfinance is quite developed compared 
to other African countries and considered as one of the developed microfinance sectors in the region. 
However, its sector showed a negative growth from 2011 and 2012 (the overall score has dropped by 
2.1%). The negative effect is mainly due mainly to the exorbitant increase in inflation rate during the 
past years with an inflation rate was about 18.7% in 2011. In reaction to the inflation pressures, the 
central bank increased the main policy interest rate from 13% to 23% in just 4 months (from July to 
November). As a result, the microfinance demand shrank which explains the negative change in the 
overall score of about 2.1% between the year 2011 and 2012. Since 2003, Uganda has passed explicit 
legislation in order to introduce new range of regulation to cater microfinance institutions. The 
Ugandan Microfinance Institutions have been categorized into 4 tiers. Supervision and monitoring 
depends on MFIs’ category. MFIs are regulated by the Bank of Uganda according to the Microfinance 
Deposit-taking Institutions (MDI) Act of 2003 and the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) of 2004. Each 
category is supervised under one of the two departments of the Bank of Uganda Supervision Unit. Tier 
1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 institutions operate under strict regulatory and supervisory restrictions by the Bank 
of Uganda and they are subject to minimum capital adequacy requirements. However, Tier 4 
institutions, which enclose the informal microfinance sector, are monitored by other parties like the 
National Board of Non-Governmental Organization and the Department of Cooperatives within the 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry.  
Financial reporting and accounting restrictions in Uganda have also been developed over the recent 
past years. Formal MFIs are required to comply with IFRS standards in their reporting. In particular, 
they are asked to prepare external audited quarterly statements and present the annual audited financial 
reports regarding the public disclosing interest rates and performance indicators of the loans. 
However, NGOs and SACCOs do not have to follow these standards. The strong regulatory and 
supervisory system, subsequently, makes Uganda, according to the EIU data 2012, ranked three in the 
world microfinance ranking in term of regulatory framework and practices and number two among 
OIC countries. 
II.2. Financial Performance    
In microfinance industry, the biggest problems practitioners face are outreach and sustainability. The 
growth of different microfinance institutions is much related to microfinance programs and funds 
requirements. At some stage when they are quasi-matured, namely when outreach, cost effectiveness 
and portfolio quality are being relatively achieved, MFIs can leverage funds from commercial banks. 
Notwithstanding, these MFIs have to provide enough guarantees in case of default. Good regulatory 
and supervisory environment facilitate the access to this commercial funds by setting up strong 
legislative and regulatory systems and specific MFIs standards, including capital adequacy ratios, 
portfolio quality indicators and accounting transparency. Credibility of MFIs in the eye of customers, 
on the other hand, should be assured through credit information and secured transactions.  
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Figure 5. Financial and Performance Indicators in some OIC Countries  
 
Financial indicators matter a lot in MFIs rating. Indeed, microfinance rating agencies, unlike the 
typical rating agencies that focus mainly on issued debt riskiness, rate MFIs overall performance 
indicators in terms of outreach and sustainability (Hartarska, 2005). In this study, According to EIU 
Data, 281 MFIs in the 16 representative OIC countries are being examined. They account for 11.92% 
for the total value of loan portfolios (74.4 over US$623.7 millions) and for 19.71% of the total number 
of deposit accounts. A brief look at figures 4 and 5 leads to obscure notes. In OIC countries, 
operational self sufficiency of the MFIs is relatively verified except in Nigeria and Cameroon where 
Portfolio At Risk (PAR) exceeds 10%. Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria and Kyrgyz Republic, which have low 
to average Regulatory Framework and Practices Scores, seem to have the higher rates of Weighted 
Average Return on Assets (10%, 9.1%, 5.8% and 5.3%, respectively). Previous empirical research on 
microfinance regulation has attempted to find a relationship between financial performance and 
regulation. Hartarska (2005) analyzes MFIs in Central and Eastern Europe, and finds that regulated 
MFIs perform less ROA compared to unregulated MFIs. In a following work, Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) find no significant relationship between regulation and financial and performance. 
This result is also consistent with the results of Mersland and Strøm (2009). On the other hand, Ben 
Soltane (2009) conducts an empirical study on 40 MFIs from Mediterranean countries, and finds that 
MFIs that comply with accounting practices achieve higher rates of performance. Besides, he shows 
that MFIs that are subject to regular financial auditing are associated with better sustainability. 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE: GROUP LIABILITY, PEER MONITROING 
AND TRANSACTION COSTS  
Microfinance is defined as “The collection of banking practices built around providing small loans 
(typically without collateral) and accepting tiny savings deposits” (Armendáriz and Murduch, 2005). It 
provides a large package of financial services to poor households. The impressive part is that the latter 
are not required offering collateral in order to benefit from a microfinance scheme, which is definitely 
not the case when dealing with the traditional banking system. Till now, there is no striking evidence 
of an efficient micro lending mechanism that assure high repayment rates, lower transaction costs 
(including cost of default), maximum pay off and a positive macroeconomic and social impacts. Some 
research studies find that the joint liability feature of group lending leads to an optimum contract. 
Whereas others researchers, based on field empirical studies, show that there is no change in 
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repayment rate while switching from group liability to individual liability. In the following subsection, 
we review these studies. 
III.1. Group versus individual liability 
Microfinance institutions, referred to as MFIs, have developed innovative microfinance mechanisms 
to guarantee their sustainability. The most common is group lending. This mechanism makes the 
group of borrowers, rather than the solely borrowers, responsible for the repayment of the loan made 
by a member of them. If the group cannot afford the repayment of the loan, than the entire group’s 
members have to contribute to its repayment or they will be penalized, and they will be banned to ask 
for additional loans in the future. Usually, members within each group are either relatives or neighbors 
and have social ties (referred to as “social capital” in the literature) which may facilitate individuals to 
monitor and screen each others. Joint liability, which serves as a perfect collateral substitute, 
stimulates monitoring, screening and debt enforcement. Thus, repayment rates in group micro lending 
contracts are expected to be high. 
Theoretically, group liability leads to efficient micro lending contracts (Besley and Coates, 1995; 
Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; and Armendáriz and Gollier, 2000). Some of the theoretical studies focus 
on social ties within group lending and its role on repayment performance of the group. Besley and 
Coates (1995) stress that without social sanction; individual liability may overcome group liability and 
suggest that social collateral bolsters group liability contracts. In the same line of research, Wydick 
(2001), in his model, shows the threat of expulsion from the group is a credible sanction that 
contributes to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium punishment strategy. From another angle, others 
illustrate the advantage of group lending contracts on individual contracts. Armendáriz and Gollier 
(2000) specify that this advantage is due mainly to the innate aspect of the group lending programs 
which is the joint liability term of contracts. Rai and Sjöström (2004) argue that joint liability is a 
puzzling element to an optimal lending contract in the presence of imperfect informal arrangement. 
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), using a simple economic model, show that the implementation of joint 
liability ameliorates enforcement of repayment problems
21
.  
However, field evidence proved otherwise. By implementing a field experiment conducted by the 
Green Bank in the Philippines over three consecutive years, Giné and Karlan (2008) find that 
repayment rates remain unaffected when group liability centers convert to individual liability. Earlier 
research of Giné and Karlan (2006), studied over one year, find similar results. Despite of the weaker 
peer loan monitoring, they remark higher growth in individual liability mainly due to the discharge of 
the new members from social constraints of the existing members. Recently, many MFIs switch to 
individual liability contracts rather than group liability. Even the Grameen Bank is changing his 
strategy, which was based on the logic that insider have the right to screen and monitor her peers, to 
become more “flexible” by permitting individuals to benefit from another loan in case of default, and, 
thus, help them to get back on the track. Lenders, still, are afraid to adopt the new “flexi-loans” 
program as they presume to be riskier and costly.  
Sharma and Zeller (1997) provide empirical evidence that repayment problems increase when group 
members are relatives, arguing that the latter, in practice, resort to other alternatives for debt 
enforcement like repayment delay. Ahlin and Townsend (2003) also find that the presence of strong 
social capital in group lending in Thailand is associated with weaker repayment performance. Gómez 
and Santor (2003) find that the probability of repayment default is much weaker when group members 
know each other before joining the group and have greater trust between them. 
 
                                                          
21
 However, they indicate that social capital, all along with group size and dynamic incentives, is among the 
problems lenders face in joint liability contracts. The peer pressure in such context may have negative 
implications on group members’ lives, such the case of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee where 
group members act violently against defaulters. In the same context, Montgomery (1996) mentions a story of a 
woman whose house was flattened when she failed to pay her housing loan. 
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III.2. Information asymmetry and transaction costs 
Higher interest rates drive worthy borrowers out of credit market, leading to inefficient outcome. This 
is a market “imperfection”. Abbink et al. (2006) demonstrate, using laboratory experiments, that 
higher interest rates increase default rates. MFIs suffer from a major problem, information asymmetry, 
which is due mainly to moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard
22
 occurs when lenders have 
limited information on the effort made by borrowers once the financial contract signed while adverse 
selection occurs when the lender cannot differentiate between the types of borrowers according to the 
riskiness of their projects. Analyzing adverse selection and moral hazard is necessary to understand 
market imperfections. Although it is costly, effective loan monitoring can help MFIs overcome the 
problems resulting from these imperfections. Loan monitoring is very important to assure effective 
loan utilization and timely repayment.        
III.2.1. Adverse selection problem 
In case of adverse selection problem, when lenders risk their inability to distinguish risky borrowers 
from safer borrowers, group self-formation provides the needed information about each member of the 
group. By doing so, potential borrowers would attempt to select the safer among them, eliminate the 
bad credit risks to prevent projects default, and thus lower interest rates by reducing costs. Ghatak 
(1999) argue that this screening mechanism can help to reduce adverse selection. Another way to 
stretch information to the lender is through public repayment meetings, which is a strategy made by 
Grameen Bank and its replicators, consists in organizing public meetings when borrowers repay their 
loans.  This enables MFIs or micro lenders to extract private information revealed from members 
about each others during the meetings. However, attending group meetings can be costly for 
borrowers, especially in rural areas where clients’ houses are distant.      
Efficient design of microcredit contact depends largely on the presence of informal side-contracting 
and a high cost of default. Rai and Sjöström (2010), by presenting theoretical models, attempt to 
determine the efficient microcredit contact, taking into consideration informal side-contracting. Their 
findings differ accordingly. When informal side-contracting is perfect, the design of the micro lending 
contract is, then, relatively unimportant. In other words, whatever be the micro lending contract 
scheme, it will be efficient i.e. the funds offered by lenders will be used efficiently by borrowers to 
maximize their surplus. The most important is to provide sufficient resources for clients, rather than 
concerning about how they are provided. In the real world, however, side-contracting is indeed 
imperfect, which is due to “internal contractual frictions” (informational and enforcement problems). 
In such world, public repayment meeting subsidizes traditional collateral, and borrowers can mutually 
insure each other against default. Liability doesn’t matter a lot. A change from joint liability to 
individual liability would not shape repayment rates. However, when repayments are not made at 
public meetings, repayment rates deteriorate and borrowers are no longer mutually insured. Mutual 
Insurance arrangements are only incentive compatible if the cost of default is high enough to prevent 
strategic default
23
. Public repayment meetings are, otherwise, useless.  Furthermore, Natarajan (2004) 
proves that repayment rates in joint liability contracts are very high even when households are not able 
to offer any traditional form of collateral. Group lending can, thus, solve the problem of adverse 
selection (Ghatak, 2000 and Armandáriz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000).  
III.2.2. Moral hazard problems     
Moral hazard was studied by, among others, Stiglitz (1990), Benerjee et al. (1994) and Laffont and 
Rey (2003). Moral Hazard can occur in two different cases. Customers, when they get their loans from 
lenders, can choose to falsely declare big loss or default, and flee with the money. This is an ex-post 
                                                          
22
  “Moral Hazard in lending refers to situations where lenders cannot observe either the effort made or action 
taken by the borrower, or the realization of project return” (Armandáriz and Morduch, 2005). 
23
 Giné et al., (2011), show that strategic default occurs frequently in joint liability context. The reason behind 
this phenomenon is that borrowers voluntary prefer declare default when the number of defaulters within their 
group rises, rather they support joint liability. They find that 95% of Muslims and 89% of Hindus reveal that, 
although they have enough money to pay back their loan, they chose not to do. 
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moral hazard. In such case, the damage is certain. Lenders lose the loan total amount, and they have no 
choice but enforcing the loan contract, something hard to do in developing countries due to the lack of 
an efficient judicial systems. Even if we assume otherwise, the exorbitant costs of the process, 
compared to the small size of the loan, would prevent lenders to go forward. The second case arises 
when lenders are unable to ensure the effort made by borrowers to success their micro projects, or to 
verify that the money they have been lent for specific purpose
24
 is indeed spent for that purpose. This 
is an ex-ante moral hazard. Lenders need sort of “internal” source of information to get the feedback 
of each borrower’s project investment. Screening and monitoring by peers in group lending programs 
can mitigate ex-ante moral hazard issues by imposing penalties upon borrowers who have chosen high 
risky projects (Stiglitz, 1990). In Stiglitz’s model, the sanctions are costless, and informational 
problems can be efficiently treated. But, typically, monitoring and enforcement are costly even in 
group liability contract. The difference is that, in Stiglitz’s model, the risk barred by the lender is 
minimized, while in models where monitoring is costly, the risk is transferred from lenders to 
borrowers.  
In presence of moral hazard, when micro entrepreneurs observe each other’s efforts undertaken to run 
their projects, group lending contract is, then, optimal and more efficient, for the lender, than 
individual lending. This efficiency cuts down when they collude, but, still, remains better than when 
they do not observe each other’s efforts, and do not use, at the same time, appropriate revelation 
mechanism. Information sharing is needed prevailing in group lending even when they perfectly 
collude. Mutual monitoring can be costly for entrepreneurs. Lenders induce the latter to monitor each 
other’s if the cost does not exceed a specific threshold (Laffont and Rey, 2003). Cason, Gangadharan 
and Maitra (2012) find that, when peer monitoring is less costly to lender monitoring, sequential group 
lending can perform better than individual lending in term of higher take-up rates of microcredit 
contracts and repayment. However, when monitoring costs in group and individual lending models are 
equivalent, the group liability has no effect on lending, monitoring and repayment behavior.   
To summarize, the puzzle of microcredit remains, so far, cloud. Group lending contracts, with lower 
cost of monitoring and enforcement, can be seen as the most suitable scheme that lenders may opt for. 
Individual based contracts perform better in term of capital return, but rising interest rate above a 
certain limit may affect the borrowers’ portfolio quality, and thus, reduce the MFI’s profitability. 
Information problems shape the principal-agent relationship and lead to high transaction costs, related 
to searching, monitoring and enforcement costs, which are reflected directly on the interest rate 
endured totally by the borrower. How to overcome such problems remains the core interest of 
researchers.  
IV. ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE PRACTICES  
IV.1. Review of the literature on Islamic Microfinance   
Islamic microfinance is the provision of Shariah-compliant financial services to the low-income 
individuals. It is the merger of two rapidly growing industries which are Islamic finance and 
microfinance. According to Islamic rules, financial inclusion is assured through two main economic 
instruments, risk-sharing and equitable redistribution of wealth. It is inspired from the core basic of 
Islamic economics, which is achieving social justice i.e. providing equal opportunities for all social 
segments (Chapra, 1983). Islamic microfinance provides risk-sharing financing contracts, or Debt-
based financing contracts, and promotes for access to finance. Market imperfections, mainly due to 
information asymmetry and higher transaction cost, enforce the financial exclusion. These 
impediments ban low income people (unbanked), or micro enterprises that lack collateral to get benefit 
from financial market access. Information asymmetry problems often exist in Profit and Loss Sharing-
based contracts. Literature provides restrictive studies analyzing the efficiency of different mode of 
financing based on Shariah principles under asymmetry information problems. In an attempt to study 
the relationship between the financial capital structure and the agents’ incentives under asymmetry 
                                                          
24
 Microfinance programs offer different range of services including microcredit for investment, consumption, 
and education, among others.  
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information, Yousfi (2012) explores the feature of two specific PLS-based contracts, which are 
Mudarabah and Musharakah financing modes, under moral hazard problem. Analytical analyses come 
up with interesting findings. In Mudarabah-based financing contracts, the risk assumed by the lender, 
under moral hazard problem, is very high
25
. The latter has no control rights and he lacks the exact 
information on the effort made by the entrepreneur to succeed her project. So, in order to increase the 
entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort, he must have the highest profit share proportion. In such case, 
entrepreneur would be more committed to succeed his project to assure higher returns when business 
success is attained. Moral hazard can be solved, hence. However, Musharakah
26
 financing scheme 
cannot solve such problem. In this mode of financing, lender and entrepreneur contribute in financing 
and in the management, all together. Therefore, the profits are shared according to a pre-determined 
ratio, and losses are jointly endured by both of them according to their capital contribution. In the 
context of microfinance, the IMFI serves as partner or investor with the micro entrepreneur in income-
generating activities, instead of mere lender. By developing a theoretical model, Yousfi (2012) finds a 
negative relationship between capital structure and management. By assuming the efforts made by the 
entrepreneur and the lender to be costly, she demonstrates that, in an optimal financial contract, the 
entrepreneur’s financial contribution is decreasing with his share in management. Indeed, when the 
lender is more engaged in management, he will generate costly and non-contradictable efforts as they 
are unobservable. The entrepreneur will have then to provide higher amount of equity to pay the extra 
cost. As a result none of them would be motivated to make their best levels of efforts. Nabi (2013) 
introduces alternative mechanisms to increase the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert the needed effort to 
succeed the project. He suggests that, in equity-based contracts, profits can be shared according to two 
different shares initially fixed but ex-post revealed and contingent on the success or failure of the 
project. In case of failure, the profit sharing contract stipulated that the loss shares should equal the 
proportions of capital participation of each party. But in case of success the entrepreneur receives a 
higher share of the profit. He finds that within one period this mechanism increases the proportion of 
the entrepreneurs who could benefit from the profit sharing contract given the higher probability of the 
project’s success driven by the additional incentive for higher effort. In addition, Nabi (2013) shows 
that under certain conditions, having two subsequent profit sharing financial contracts reduces the 
moral hazard since the entrepreneur’s higher effort during the first period increases the second-period 
expected profit. Indeed, he shows that the second-period expected profit of the entrepreneur is 
positively correlated to the first-period probability of success. Ismal (2009), on the other hand, proves 
that, in Murabahah
27
 financing scheme, the price volatility of the goods being financed induces the 
entrepreneurs to gain easy-made profits by pretending to be default, which lead to ex-post moral 
hazard problem. Islamic banks’ investigation and monitoring can mitigate such problem by prevent 
this risk to happen until the end of the contracted period.  
Loan monitoring is important for each IMFI to maintain effective loan utilization and guarantee timely 
repayment. Repayment can be made differently depending on the Islamic Microfinance model
28
. For 
each model, specific monitoring system is needed. The matter of monitoring cost is widely common in 
PLS-based contracts. Gale and Hellwing (1985) stress that, in PLS-based contracts, lender, in order to 
observe the project’s return of the borrower, has to bear costly state verification. Mudarabah-based 
contracts are the riskiest of all Shariah-compliant financial products as the capital owner (Rab al Mal) 
has no real control over the executive management, but bears total financial losses when its partner 
(Mudarib) defaults. Under such arrangement, profits are pre-determined and shared on the basis of 
agreed ratios, while the IMFI assumes the entire losses. The latter offers the money needed for a micro 
project and the micro entrepreneur contributes by his time and effort. Control and management are the 
responsibility of the Mudarib, while the capital provider can only supervise and monitor. Moral hazard 
problem arises when the borrower has an incentive to undertake lower effort which generates in the 
                                                          
25
In Mudarabah contracts, the lender, when the project succeeds, share the pay off with the entrepreneur 
according to a pre-determined ratio. However, in case of default, the losses are totally borne by the lender (as the 
capital provider), while the entrepreneur loses nothing but its time and effort.  
26
 Musharakah is a partnership contract where two or more persons contribute by their capital and management 
together to share the profits and losses. 
27
 Murabahah is a trade-based contract with a differed payment. 
28
 For instance, incremental repayment, repayment in installment or small installments.  
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worst case the project’s failure but not financial liability. However, microfinance experiences show 
that as “brought back” shares of Mudarib increase over repayment periods, he will be more induced to 
behave for the best of his business. Also, offering repeated loans can be considered as an effective way 
to manage the risk.  
The second Islamic way to boost financial inclusion is the equitable redistribution of income among 
the society. It can be implemented, by providing funds to poor people who do not work or cannot work 
(like handicapped) to fulfill their minimum requirements (food, healthcare, education), or to micro 
enterprises, through different instruments such as Zakah, Qard hasan, Waqf, and Sadakat. In 
microfinance contracts which are based on such instruments, moral hazard problems are widely 
common. In Qard hasan (interest-free) loan context, poor borrowers have to repay the exact loan 
amount with no extra fees. By spending their loan for consumption or other purpose other than 
income-generating activity, borrowers may find themselves unable or unwilling to pay back the loan at 
the due time. In Iran, for instance, among more than 1200 Qard Hasan Fund institutions, repayment 
rate was only 60% (Kazem, 2007). Qard Hasan beneficiaries, there, believe that the money offered for 
them is a sort of Tabaru’ (for charity) as they are forgiven, when default, and no eventual punishment 
is imposed on them (Karim, Tarazi and Reille, 2008). Similar to conventional microfinance, social 
capital can serve as the basic collateral. Usually, peer monitoring and pre-selection of the clients, 
based on their reputation, contribute to lessen the moral hazard problems that lenders face.  
Islamic microfinance can also operate based on other instruments like Waqf and Zakah.  Zakah funds 
may be used in providing necessary funds to fulfill consumption needs of poor people at the first 
place. However, Zakah funds and Waqf funds may both be used in providing capital investment and 
working capital financing for micro projects. The first priority in using Zakah funds is to eradicate 
poverty by assisting the poor and the needy. Zakah fund management institutions and Waqf 
certificates of different denominations usually raise the cash funds and can be used in creating pools of 
funds in order to provide microcredit to the poor on the basis of Islamic Shariah. However, using the 
Waqf mode of financing, default rate are more likely to rise. Poor micro entrepreneur may misuse the 
granted loan by using it for consumption rather than for project investment. Implementing an 
integrated Islamic microfinance model incorporating the two modes of financing, the Zakah and the 
Waqf, may resolve fund inadequacy problem of Islamic MFIs (Hassan, 2010). Covering their basic 
needs of consumption, by the utilization of Zakah funds, micro entrepreneurs can allocate all their 
resources to succeed their businesses. Additionally, they will benefit from lower refundable loan, as no 
return can be realized from Zakah fund.  
MFIs often face different challenges and difficulties. It is crucial for them to manage a range of risks 
to prevent eventual losses, and, therefore assure their financial sustainability. Effective loan 
monitoring enhances them to overcome some of these difficulties. In the following section, we will 
present practices of three specific microfinance institutions from different countries. An outlook on 
best practices of different microfinance institutions may help practitioners and researchers to develop 
innovative products and, thus, implement efficient models.  
IV.2. Best practices for some MFIs (Conventional and Islamic)     
IV.2.1. AL AMAL Microfinance Bank (Yemen)  
Since the stormed political crisis in 2011, Yemen is facing a difficult economic situation. After The 
“Arab Spring”, growth in Yemen fell by more than 10% in 2011, followed by a further 1.9% decrease 
in 2012, leading to social unrest
29
. By the end of 2011, poor people were about 12 million. 
Consequently, microfinance sector has been affected. Islamic Microfinance has a great potential in 
Yemen. 90% of MFIs offer Shariah-compliant products and services, yet, with a total number of 
active clients of about 75 000 in 2011. This number is much to rise to reach 1 million customers
30
. 
Many MFIs in Yemen have moved forward to achieve this goal. Al AMAL microfinance institution 
                                                          
29
 The World Bank. “Global Unemployment Trends 2013: Recovering from a second jobs dip”. 
30
 According to Mr. Najah Al Mugahed, managing director of Yemen Microfinance Network. 
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(AMB), for instance, which is considered to be the leader institution, declared to a strategy to expand 
its clients’ portfolio and use innovative types of Shariah-compliant products. Accordingly, in 2011 it 
was named as the winner of the “Islamic Microfinance Challenges Award 2010” and the winner of the 
“Most Innovative Microfinance Product” for offering new microfinance products compatible with 
Shariah principles which are Ijara, Savings
31
 and Takaful
32
.  
After the crisis, AMB’s senior executive management team opted for an option to assure the 
sustainability of the bank. They have chosen to develop a Contingency Plan by “continuing lending 
carefully, implementing the maximums possible of the 2011 Business plan activities and coping with 
the crisis according to the contingency plan of the bank”33. They recourse to new risk management 
procedures to mitigate the crisis effects on the performance of the bank, like the use of Value At Risk 
(VAR). The crisis had some negative impacts on the microfinance bank: decrease of the loan portfolio, 
an increase of average Portfolio At Risk from 1% to 2.5% in one year, and cut of funds from some 
international organizations. However, the contingency plan comes up with overall positive results. 
AMB succeed to surpass the crisis effects by making a portfolio total value of $US820, 000 and 
realizing a positive growth rate of 1.3% at the end of 2011. By April 2012, the Bank succeeded to 
decline the PAR to 1.2%.  
To resolve the problem of credit risk, AMB adopted the group-based financing scheme. 65% of its 
loan portfolios are group-based where the group itself serves as collateral. However, the individual 
loans are offered mainly to employee where their wages serve as required collateral. Thus, covering 
non-salaried people may expand client outreach.  
Figure 6. Impacts of the adoption of “Contingency Plan” on portfolio growth  
 
AL AMAL bank uses only three distinct Shariah-compliant products, Murabahah and Ijara for 
investment fund, and Takaful for microinsurance. In order to reduce credit risk, it adopts a dual-core 
strategy based on credit portfolios’ diversification; geographical and customer diversification. It has 
13 credit bureaus and a total number of active borrowers of about 16 000 clients, with more than 65% 
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 The offering of voluntary saving accounts  presents an outstanding opportunity for low-income people to 
become familiar with the saving culture, and thus benefit from its advantages. In 2011, the number of active 
savers in AMB bank rises to 33 047, that is about $US5.5 million saving portfolio value
31
, focusing mainly on 
woman and children (46% are female and 27% are children). AMB is the first MFI in the MENA region to offer 
micro-saving product. 
32
 Established in 2002 by joint contribution of the Yemeni Government, represented by SFD, Arab Gulf Program 
for United Nations Development Organization (AGFUND), and also of both Yemeni and Saudi private sectors. 
But it starts its operations in 2009. It has 25% of microfinance market share in Yemen in 2011. 
33
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180 
1814 
820 618 
320 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2009 2010 2011
Continuing Growth (000$) Retaining # of active borrowers (000$) Suspending Lending (000$)
17 
 
female, and only 5% of the clients coverage are living in rural areas. The average loan disbursement 
size is USD 239 which indicates that the bank targeted clients are mainly the extremely poor. The 
main challenges facing AL AMAL bank today is how to expand its services to cover rural areas under 
difficult social and security circumstances. Enhancing the implementation of Islamic microfinance 
credit bureaus amongst the rural regions can extend improve the financial access of another category 
of the community, which is more familiar with informal cooperative transactions. Partnership with 
other institutions may also offer the possibility for greater outreach and expansion. Besides, adopting 
an innovative Islamic microfinance model based on Waqf and Zakah may help the bank to include 
Qard Hassan investments among its products. Waqf-based IMFIs can compete with innovative 
products of conventional MFIs and enhance the practice of Islamic principles and values within 
microfinance industry (Ahmed, 2007). 
IV.2.2. ASA (Bangladesh)  
Bangladesh is the first country that formally introduced Islamic Microfinance Institutions. They have 
successfully implemented different Shariah-compliant financial products and models to finance micro 
enterprises and low-income people (Murabahah, Bay’ Mu’ajjal and Waqf). The total number of clients 
using Shariah-compliant microfinance products and services rises to 445,000, where 56,000 of them 
use Qard hasan loans, with a total outstanding portfolio of about US$92 million (El-Zoghbi and 
Tarazi, 2013). A summary of such experiences is shown in Table 3 in Appendix 2. 
According to Forbes Magazine, ASA (Association for social Advancement), the Bangladesh 
microfinance institution, is ranked at the top ranking of 50 MFIs all over the world, in term of 
sustainability, cost effectiveness and financial performance, while Jagorani Chakra Foundation and 
Grameen Bank came at the 16
th
 and 17
th
 place, respectively. Besides, it was classified as one of the 
100 best NGOs of the World in 2012 by “The Global Journal”. ASA is a wide-spread NGO, with more 
than 4,735,000 of active members and 3,025 branch offices located in 64 Bangladeshi districts. It 
offers a wide range of products and services to large number of poor population. In particular, it offers 
products like microcredit, microinsurance (mini life insurance and loan insurance), savings 
(mandatory, voluntary and long term savings), and foreign remittance services. Other than financial 
services, ASA provides non-financial services in order to improve the socio-economic condition of 
their clients, namely health assistance and awareness, education strengthening program, and 
physiotherapy and Yoga treatment to their traumatized clients.  
Since its establishment in 1978, the NGO has been implicated in different social business investments. 
Lately, in April 2013, ASA president pronounces the 1
st
 convocation of the establishment of “ASA 
University Bangladesh”, with the main objective of providing access to a high educational institution 
to lower middle income and poor families through covering tuition fee for poor and women citizen 
students, and scholarships for overseas students.   
The specificity of ASA arises from its clear vision and straightforward objectives, simplicity in 
management and operational procedures, and its awareness of how and when to achieve them in 
efficient ways. Just few years after it was set up, ASA has taken several strategic decisions and been 
engaged in multiple-goals projects, including: 
- In 1987, ASA found the “Socio Economic Credit Program” which is a leader program targeting 
rural organized groups, with the objective is to get them access to effective microcredit and 
savings products.  
- It concentrated its activities on rural areas where more than 70% of total population lives. 
- It evolved the “ASA Microfinance Sustainable Development Model”, where the ultimate goal 
was to ensure cost reduction and income increase within the shortest period. Cost reduction was 
guaranteed through setting cost leverage for all kind of expenditure (provides minimum and 
simple furniture for collective use, easy and simple management system, no office assistance or 
even night guard in the units, avoids technical assistance). Consequently, the cost per Taka lent 
has downfallen from 0.092 in 1993 to 0.059 in 2012. Income increase is realized by expanding its 
activities into new areas, organizing weekly repayment meetings to ensure strict monitoring, 
insuring borrowers’ life, and setting quick information and management on loan default. 
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- In 1993, the ASA Research Center was established to conduct studies and surveys, and present 
them to different field actors (ASA staff members, other NGOs, investors, donor agencies, and 
media). Besides, the center organizes regular field trip for management monitoring. 
- In 2006, the “Catalyst Microfinance Investors” was set up.  
- It spreads its activities in 8 different foreign countries, namely in Ghana, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Nigeria.  
- ASA established “ASA-NGO Partnership Build up Program”, which is a pioneering program 
including 33 active financial partners (NGOs) from all over the country. Through this partnership, 
ASA aims to assist small and emerging NGOs (which play a role in poverty alleviation) with the 
technical support, skilled manpower and necessary loan funds to assure their sustainability within 
the shortage time. 
As a result, ASA scaled up its operations after it had succeeded to achieve high repayment rates 
(99.65% in 2012), high portfolio quality (the PAR was about 2.90% in 2012) and cost effectiveness 
(operational cost/total average assets reached 9.18% in 2012). By adopting a strategy based on 
reducing dependency on foreign funds, ASA succeeded to establish its financial and operational self-
sufficiency. Since 2001, ASA doesn’t accept any grant or donation. Instead, it uses its own funds 
mainly from its generating-income activities.  
Figure 7. Funding sources of ASA 
 
Despite the remarkable contribution of ASA in the development of the microfinance industry in 
Bangladesh, a large number of the poor population remains uncovered due to their religious 
commitment
34
. Islamic microfinance in Bangladesh remains far from covering that segment of 
population. The largest microfinance institutions that offer shariah-compliant products have about 
100,000 active borrowers, while the largest conventional microfinance institutions (ASA, Grameen 
Bank and BRAC) have more than 15 million borrowers.  
IV.2.3. KASHF Foundation (Pakistan)  
Kashf Foundation is a leading MFI in Pakistan. It started as an action of research program in 1996 
supported by Grameen Bank, and has operated as its replicator. It offers group liability based loan 
contracts (“general loan”) where their main objectives are to alleviate poverty through enforcing 
women empowerment. The selection of clients is based on strict poverty criteria, and assured by loan 
officers after a door to door mobilization process. Group centers of 20 to 25 female members are 
formed. Within each center, a credit committee that includes a manager and different group leaders is 
created to provide necessary information diffusion and guarantee discipline. In case of default or non-
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payment, each member is responsible for the loan repayment of the other member.  In addition to the 
general loan, the Foundation offers a complementary loan, so called “emergency loan”, to their clients 
for different purposes during hard times (pay children’s school fees, utility bills and urgent 
expenditures). This loan is easy and quick to get, and is designed to help women to be at ease and 
relieved during financial flux with no need to ask for traditional loan with high interest fees or solicit 
informal arrangements by requesting money from families or relatives. 
It began with 15 clients in 1996 to reach to 76,170 active clients in 2005, covering a cumulative 
number of 250,000 families. For the last decade, Kashf Foundation has maintained its recovery rate at 
100% while its portfolio quality has ameliorated (Portfolio at risk-1 day decreased from 0.61% to 
0.32% in 2005)
35
. In order to boost its portfolio growth, the Foundation has chosen to focus on 
repeated clients. Clients who beneficiate from first loan are allowed to take larger size loans. In 2003, 
it succeeded to build a good reputation as the first specialized microfinance institution in Pakistan that 
achieve financial sustainability. Build upon its reputation and experience, and after 12 years since its 
establishment, Kashf Foundation moved forward to set up a regulated commercial microfinance bank, 
the Kashf Microfinance Bank Limited (KMBL). The law in Pakistan requires that any microfinance 
institution cannot upgrade to Microfinance Bank unless it serves for at least 3 years
36
. The act was 
taking to extend outreach by enlarging target clients, especially low income savers, through presenting 
a new model based on deposits-taking privilege, and by widening distribution network through the 
implementation of different branches all over the country. Actually, the bank has 31 branches in 26 
cities in three provinces, and is planning to open up to 100 branches in 31 cities in the four provinces 
and in Azad Jammu Kashmir during the next five years. Adopting a new distribution channel strategy 
based on branchless banking may help accomplish the goal. In Pakistan, branchless banking services 
are widely offered by several microfinance institutions as they facilitate payment procedures to 
customers and reduce loans operating costs. 
Kashf Bank maintained a Capital Adequacy Ratio of about 12.8% at the end of 2011, less than the 
ratio required by law. According to the “Prudential Regulations for Microfinance Banks” issued by the 
State Bank of Pakistan, MFBs are required to CAR of at least 15% of their risk weighted assets. By 
the end of 2012, the bank has to meet the required ratio in order to guarantee long term financial 
sustainability.  
V. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE 
INDUSTRY 
Countries where microfinance industry is developed, like Pakistan, Indonesia and Uganda, display 
strong regulatory and supervisory systems (Table 4 in Appendix 2 summarizes experiences of some 
countries). Studying successful microfinance experiences help countries with less developed 
microfinance sector to examine their keys of success, and to defeat the gaps attributed to problems 
inherent to the MFI itself and to the institutional and regulatory environment as a whole, and to 
implement practical acts accordingly. Specialized governmental institutions (like Central Banks) 
appear to play the major role in enhancing MFIs to perform better in term of client protection, risk 
management and innovation. They help to develop the banking infrastructure, encourage the use of 
good practices, and provide regulatory and supervisory mechanisms to enable MFIs to develop viable 
business models. As these institutions are important means to put into effect regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks, there is a need for a supportive legislative framework to be set at one fell 
swoop. Reforms have to be implemented in OIC countries with the objective to improve the regulatory 
framework. Parallel reforms in legislative system would enforce the process. Besides, efficient 
business disputes resolution ensures MFIs’ credibility and enhance their reputation.  
Due to their deposit-taking and payment-processing activities, formal banks typically require special 
regulatory treatments. They must comply with rigid regulation and are subject to the direct supervision 
of public authorities. Prudential regulation is set to manage systematic risks and aim to protect 
depositors’ rights. Adopting non-prudential regulation relying on public disclosure is also required to 
protect both consumers and investors, ensure competition and to prevent fraud and exploitation. 
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Microfinance activities, including credit, saving and insurance services are similar to banking 
activities from financial and institutional perspectives. Financial regulation appears to be primordial 
for microfinance banks or institutions taking deposits from the public to ensure the stability and 
sustainability of the MFI. However, a rush to publicly regulate microfinance sector is inadvisable. 
Authorities have to set the regulation in a way to make supervision of the new licensed MFIs, 
including licensed special windows, easier to manage and control. It is recommended to ration the 
number of licenses, especially at an early stage i.e. when the market is still immature, by setting 
minimum capital requirement through regulation rather than legislation
37
. Gradual public/private
38
 
cooperation in the regulation process might be more efficient (Macchiavello, 2012).  
Development of Islamic microfinance cannot be achieved without consistent reforms in legislative and 
judicial systems. Parallel reforms are required to set a favorable environment for IMFIs to operate and 
expand their activities. How gaining customers and investors’ confidence is considered as the main 
objective of each Islamic microfinance institution. This issue is illustrated in figure 8. Microfinance 
providers and their partners need to assure investors and donors about their social performance and the 
microfinance sector’s financial reliability in order to receive funds and technical assistance. Customers 
who trust the credibility of the IMF institution would voluntary save their money in that institution. 
Besides, they would be relieved to offer their Zakah, Waqf or Tabaru’ funds to IMF institutions. Low 
income customers often have lower education levels and have limited experience in formal financial 
services. They may accept to use sophisticated Islamic microfinance products without the necessity to 
fully understand their principals and financial mechanisms simply because they trust the adherence of 
the IMFIs to Islamic rules in their products and services. On the other hand, IMFIs are able to solicit 
for funds from commercial Islamic banks which impose as a condition a certain level of sustainability 
and outreach.  
In this section, we propose bi-dimensional policy recommendations that could be considered for the 
development of Islamic microfinance industry in countries willing to achieve this goal but constrained 
by multifaceted problems. The first dimension of recommendations is addressed to policy makers, 
while the second is devoted to the heads of microfinance institutions management team.  
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 The role of private cooperation with the international organizations, like international microfinance networks, 
rating agencies, social investors and CGAP which release their own guidelines and standards serving as extra 
informal regulatory power, may contribute to fill regulatory gaps with the public regulator experience in the 
microfinance field. By developing their own consumer protection codes and monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, these institutions show MFIs how to properly behave in order to obtain financing. 
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                                                                          Figure 8.  Development of Islamic Microfinance 
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Authorities whose objectives to develop the Islamic microfinance in their countries may focus as a 
starting point on enhancing the regulatory and institutional frameworks in their countries through:  
A. Reinforce the legislative systems  
The regulatory framework has the ultimate goal of protecting the entire financial system. It is set to 
license IMFI and to define the rules based on general standards to which the latter has to stick, like 
capital adequacy, minimum capital requirements, corporate government requirements, financial 
discloser, loan loss provision and reserve requirements. It consists of the prudential and non-prudential 
regulation. When a deposit-taking microfinance institution turn out to be insolvent, it becomes 
difficult for it to repay its depositors especially when it is a small institution. Consequently, clients’ 
confidence on financial system will be undermined resulting in run on deposits. Government or the 
financial authority, in order to undermine inherent risks, requires microfinance institutions to comply 
with prudential regulation to protect their financial soundness. Such restrictions can promote 
microfinance sector. Specifically, they can better access to commercial and non-commercial sources of 
funds, improve standards of control and reporting and thus achieve growth and outreach goal (Rhyne, 
2002). However, prudential regulation is costly, officious and relatively difficult to be often practiced 
by MFIs, contrary to non-prudential regulation which is much easier to apply as it focuses only on 
preserving the interests of customers and investors. 
Regulation and supervision must be jointly set. Regulation without supervision and enforcement 
instruments is useless. Supervision is a public financial authority duty and usually based on the “Basel 
Committee on Banking and Supervision” recommendations which present the Basel Core Principles 
(known as Basel II) as the suitable framework for supervisors of deposit-taking MFIs. Supervision is 
assured through two instruments, the On-site and the Off-site supervision. The On-site supervision 
concentrates mainly on information systems of MFIs, their credit and governance systems, internal 
control
39
 within each institution and portfolios evaluations, while the Off-site supervision focuses on 
providing supportive data analysis for eventual on-site inspections.  
Self-supervisory solutions have been often implemented by MFIs in order to identify and manage 
various risks before being visible to regulators or outside stakeholders, but appeared to be ineffective 
in protecting the soundness of the regulated institutions especially after the recent microfinance crises 
(like the Moroccan microcredit crisis in 2009
40
 and the crisis in Andhra Pradesh in India in 2010). 
Self-supervisory solutions are considered as weak form of supervision as, first, MFIs are not enough 
induced to impose sanctions on themselves, and second the inexistence of legal instruments to enforce 
compliance to regulatory rules. The reasons of their inefficiency in India are related to the extreme 
commercialization of the sector, fragmentation, large size, hard competition and multiple borrowings. 
Similar reasons behind the microcredit crisis in Morocco where it started when the second largest MFI 
in the country, Zakoura, declared to have credit risk of 30% (which is a higher credit risk than ever 
reported) and so decided to stop all disbursements. The bad situation drove many clients to default 
their loans. 40% of clients receive loans from multiple microfinance providers (clients had two to five 
loans outstanding) at once without disclosing it to the creditors. This factor help non repayment 
problem to stretch to imperil the whole microcredit sector. In 2009, the Moroccan sector overall credit 
risk was about 13.7%
41
. It has been shown, hence, that it is better to focus on prudential regulation on 
large and deposit-taking microfinance institutions that pose a systemic risk due to their size.   
Islamic microfinance institutions  have also to contribute to  the development of Islamic microfinance 
industry by  well managing their human resources, commit to the client protection principles, 
implement appropriate Risk management system, adopt new distribution strategies.IMFs should 
enhance the management of their human resources 
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 According to The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, internal control is considered as “a process, 
effected by an entity’s board of directors/trustees, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives” including verification of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations, ensure of the reliability and completeness of financial and management information, 
and conformity with applicable laws and regulations. 
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 CGAP. “Brief lessons learned from the Moroccan crisis”, July 2013. 
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 IFC private study and Moroccan Central Bank’s 2010 Annual Report 
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Islamic microfinance is a specialized field that combines banking activities with Islamic social goals. 
Clients in general lack education about Islamic finance principles and standards. Providing trained 
managers and staff for Islamic microfinance institutions would cast doubt on the adherence of these 
institutions to such rules and principles. The staff of the Islamic microfinance institutions   is required 
to have educational knowledge and skills qualifications in both microfinance and Islamic finance 
related issues. Ongoing training for staff workers can be an efficient way to improve their professional 
skills and keep them engaged in their works. In fact, according to the survey report by Microfinance 
Insight in 2008, 54% of sampled MFIs offer training programs one or two times a year, while 39% of 
them offer it more than 4 times a year. 16% of MFIs that offer trainings more than 4 times a year 
consider their environment as “very competitive”. Overall, the majority of sampled MFIs indicate that 
human capital is the most challenging issue among others like financial and technology issues. They 
explain that recruiting qualified, providing relevant training and capacity building and preventing 
turnover are their priorities as they are the most difficult to ensure. (See Figures 9 and 10) 
Figure 9. Most challenging human resources issues for MFIs 
 
Source: Microfinance Insight (2008): “Human resources challenges and solutions in microfinance” 
 
Figure 10. Frequency of trainings in relation to competiveness 
 
                        Source: Microfinance Insight (2008): “Human resources challenges and solutions in microfinance” 
Ensure consistent staff training, advisory services and skills building are essential in building 
capacities services able to cope with all aspects of the sector from the regulatory and supervisory 
entities through information systems to public authority agents and funding providers. Training 
programs should be developing by time to go with modifications and changes that aim at improving 
IMFs’ efficiency and performance (Khan, 2008). Developing human resources functions and market 
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research also contribute in capacity building services for microfinance services providers whose main 
concern is to keep up with the fast changing financial inclusion landscape
42
.         
B. IMFs should commit to client protection principles 
Client protection regulation is essential in any inclusive financial system. It aims not only at protecting 
already existing clients from eventual abuses or losses resulting from MFIs failure or other reasons, 
but also assure confidence in microfinance system for potential future clients. It imposes that the 
information and data provided to customers should be complete, clear and simple to understand and 
inexpensive to access. According to a study survey made by MIX Market in 2011, consumer 
protection has been recognized as important element for MFIs to practice good ethics and smart 
microfinance. However, only 15% of representatives MFIs implement all the six Smart Campaign’s 
client protection principles
43
 (see Figure 11), while 69% of them declare to fully disclose prices, terms 
and conditions of their products to customers prior to sale, and 44% indicated that the corporate 
culture and human resource system of their institutions are being judged with high standards of ethical 
behavior. The Smart Campaign’s client protection44 principles contains 7 principles (used to be 6) 
including appropriate product design and delivery, prevention of over-indebtedness, transparency, 
responsible pricing, fair and respectful treatment of clients, privacy of client data, and effective 
mechanisms for complaint resolution
45
. 
Figure 11. Consumer protection principles across regions 
 
Source: MIX Market Social Performance Data for the financial year 2008-2009 
IMFIs that are committed to clients’ benefits and to operating profitability are expected to put the 
principles of responsible finance into action by implementing client protection principles. We have 
already mentioned in the first section the set of the Code of Conduct for Consumer Protection in 
Pakistan. By doing so, Pakistani regulators seek to overwhelm mistrust of clients and to guarantee the 
credibility of the whole microfinance sector. Signing the code means that MFIs agreed to provide the 
                                                          
42
 Koning, A., 2013, Capacity Building Survey Results, CGAP. 
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 M. Pistelli, A. Simanowitz and V. Thiel, 2011. State of practice in social performance reporting and 
management. MicroBanking Bulletin. 
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 The Smart Campaign is a global effort aims at unifying microfinance leaders worldwide around a common 
goal which is providing microfinance institutions with the necessary tools and resources to protect clients. It has 
mobilized around 1000 retail stores and a number of networks and associations. 
45
 For further details look at the draft guidance of the Smart Campaign: “Putting the Principles to Work: Detailed 
Guidance on the Client Protection Principles”, Version 2.0. September, 2011.  
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terms and conditions of all their financial services to clients which must be written in an 
understandable language, including the effective service charges, the repayment schedule, principal 
and mark-up, and any affiliated products and extra fees that may be applied later.  
C. IMFs should implement appropriate risk management system 
Risk management can be considered as one of the important factors to build sustainable MFI (Karim, 
Tarazi and Reille, 2008). Instruments of risk management and insurance in IMF scarcely differ from 
conventional MF as they are based on similar concept of mutual guarantee (kafalah) and collateral 
(daman). In case of group lending, mutual guarantee are used by almost all MFIs, both conventional 
and Islamic, while very few IMFIs, like the Indonesia BMTs and the Lebanon based Hasan Fund, 
require physical assets as collateral (Obaidullah and Khan, 2008).  
Table 5. Major Risk Categories of MFIs 
Financial Risks Operational Risks Strategic Risks 
Credit Risk          
Transaction risk 
Portfolio risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Market Risk 
Interest rate risk 
Foreign exchange risk 
Investment portfolio risk                                      
Transaction Risk 
Human resources risk 
Information & technology 
risk 
Fraud (Integrity) Risk 
Legal & Compliance Risk 
Governance Risk 
Ineffective oversight  
Poor governance structure 
Reputation Risk 
External Business Risks 
Event risk 
           Source: Microfinance Network (2000): “A Risk Management Framework for Microfinance Institutions” 
The sophistication of risk management system varies with the size, the type and the complexity of the 
MFIs. Figure 5 lists different MFIs’ risks, which are categorized into three types, which are financial 
risks, operational risks and strategic risks. Financial risks are common in both MF and IMF. 
Nevertherless, IMFIs may face additional forms of credit risks resulting from the innate aspect of the 
Shariah-based contracts. In Murabahah contracts, for instance, risks may occur from the non-delivery 
of the items from the supplier or the non-respect of repayments schedule, or even the refuse of the 
client to buy the merchandise that the IMFI has already purchased. In these cases, the IMFI can neither 
increase the amount of mark-up, nor force the client to buy the item.   
IMFIs have to assess and manage the various risks inherent to their activities. There is an increasing 
need to design risk management tools and approaches that meet with IMFIs clients’ specificities, 
lending methodologies and social and financial performance objectives. Microinsurance (or micro 
takaful) can serve as an efficient loan protection when borrowers do not repay the loan for different 
purposes (like death or physical disability) (Obaidullah and Khan, 2008). Social sanctions and religion 
ties can also prevent “committed” borrowers from misuse of their loans which may affect MFIs’ 
portfolios quality.  
D. IMFs should adopt new distribution strategies 
Similar to conventional microfinance, Islamic microfinance needs marketing strategies to achieve a 
financial stability, sustainable performance, enhance customer loyalty and, thus, increase profitability 
(Churchill and Halpern, 2001). These strategies include corporate branding, target market 
identification, product delivery systems and customer services approaches
46
.  According to Grönroos 
(1990), the most visible aspect in marketing strategies of MFIs is marketing communication which 
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 “Marketing attempts to understand the needs of the client and to adapt operations in order to meet those needs 
and achieve greater sustainability. It addresses the issues of new product development, pricing, the location of 
operations and the promotion of the institution and its products. In doing so, it creates exchanges that satisfy 
individual and organizational goals.” Kotler, Littlefield, Morduch, and Hashemi (2003). 
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involves different categories, including advertizing, sales promotion, public relations and face-to-face 
marketing. However, the lack of infrastructure for the IMFs in rural districts plus the higher 
operational costs led to think about alternative ways of how to provide banking services with 
minimum expensive to poor unbanked citizens living away towns. Developing branchless banking 
(BB) was the way out. It is an innovative distribution channel which use different technologies 
including Internet, mobile phones, and POS (Point Of Sale) and ATM (Automated Teller Machine) 
networks. The sustainable growth of telecommunications and retail industries in many devolving 
countries was at the origin of the development of this new banking system. Issuing electronic money 
(E-money or E-wallet) by Non-bank Company offer the possibility to poor customers to store, pay and 
exchange money in their region with no need to recourse to commercial banks.  
The expansion of social programs can put pressure on governments to develop branchless payment 
infrastructure in their countries which can assure safety and inexpensive transfer of funds to the poor. 
Conditional cash transfer programs have gained an immense interest by governments and international 
organizations. It has been adopted by over 60 middle income developing countries (World Bank, 
2009) where many of them have developed their own BB business models. Table 6 shows the 
countries that launched the program during the last decade. However, limiting the programs on social 
payment will not lead to broader financial inclusion (Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman, 2009). Offering 
savings accounts to beneficiaries of the programs, like the case in India, South Africa and Brazil, may 
smooth the progress.    
Table 6. Social Transfer Programs Launched (1999-2009) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China  Colombia Argentina Brazil Bangladesh Cambodia Bolivia Haiti Burkina 
Faso 
Bangladesh 
  Jamaica Bangladesh Ecuador Kenya Colombia DRC Indonesia Guatemala Kenya 
  Turkey Cambodia Mexico Pakistan Dominic 
Republic 
Malawi Swaziland Nigeria Pakistan 
   Chile Zambia Peru El 
Salvador 
Pakistan Yemen Philippines  
      India Panama    
      Peru Paraguay    
Source: Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman (2009). “Banking the poor through G2P payments”, FN CGAP and DFID 
Up to now, regulations of very few countries allow Non-bank institutions to issue E-money, including 
Bolivia, Peru, Brazil and India, while many countries are on the process to regulate the sector like 
Pakistan, Bangladesh
47
 and Mexico
48
. Comprehensive branchless banking regulations have been 
issued by the central bank of Pakistan to financial institutions for developing partnerships in order to 
extend financial services to their clients. The success of the first experience of branchless banking 
solutions, Easypaisa
49
 in Pakistan and M-PESA
50
 in Kenya, succeeded to draw the attention to increase 
the intensity of regulation on already regulated financial institutions to issue E-money accounts. 
Regulators have to take into consideration factors that may obstruct the process like the culture of their 
societies. Indeed, people who prefer cash on cards-based accounts would not accept to use the new 
mode of payment. The government in Singapore, for instance, has moved toward replacing cash with 
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 For further details see Chen (2013). “Comparing Branchless Banking in Bangladesh and Pakistan”, CGAP. 
48
 For further details see CGAP (2010), “Update on Branchless Banking Policy and Regulation in Mexico”. 
49
 It was launched jointly by Telenor Pakistan (a Telecommunication Company) and Tameer Microfinance Bank 
(MFB) in 2009 where its main objective is to provide financial inclusion to Pakistani citizen. Easypaisa shop has 
about 22,000 retailer shops in the country, covering 750 districts including cities and towns. It offers, for their 
clients, easy money transfer and bill payment solutions. Monthly, about 4 million people uses their services. 
Since its beginning, users have carried out 117 million transactions through Easypaisa services valued about 
Rs.261 billion. 
50
 It is a mobile payment services provided by Safaricom in 2007. Ever since, more than 7 million customers are 
using the service. M-PESA succeeded to promote financial inclusion in the country. In fact, the proportion of 
Kenyans that are formally financially included has doubled to reach 41% only in 3 years (FSD Kenya, 2009).     
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an electronic money system by establishing the Singapore’s Electronic Legal Tender, but seemed to be 
hard to carry on the project due to widespread resistance from the public who refused the alternative 
design of money (Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman, 2009). 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Islamic microfinance is still a niche segment but constitutes a promising industry, although it struggles 
to overcome similar difficulties and impediments of conventional peers. In many OIC countries, the 
microfinance sector is not operating under dedicated financial regulation legislation. Hence, 
understanding the regulatory and institutional environment is primordial for researchers and policy 
makers to enhance the implementation of innovative models and products in countries where 
microfinance industry is promising.  
The paper tried to analyze these problems from a macroeconomic perspective. It provided a cross-
country analysis of the institutional viability, regulatory environment and sustainability of different 
microfinance institutions followed by a presentation of the best practices of specific MFs and IMFs in 
term of monitoring under problems of asymmetry information. We presented an analysis of the 
challenges and opportunities of the Islamic microfinance industry in practice. We believe that the 
successful development of the industry in a country requires  the development of their regulatory and 
institutional frameworks. Finally, we introduce a set of recommendations forwarded to financial and 
regulatory authorities and to Islamic microfinance institutions at once. The ultimate goal is to develop 
Islamic microfinance by achieving outreach and sustainability. We believe the starting point should be 
by setting reforms in legislative and judicial systems which may protect investors and clients and, 
thus, gain their confidence. By doing so we believe that IMFIs will be able to diversify their sources of 
funds (Zakah and Waqf funds, commercial banks, voluntary savings accounts,). 
Authorities have to increase the intensity of regulation on formal IMFIs and frame informal financial 
market where the majority of IMFIs types (Cooperatives, ROSCAs, NGOs, and NBIs) are banned to 
access deposits from the public. Comparative analyses show that countries with higher business 
environment Overall Score (from the Global microscope) display strong regulatory and institutional 
environment. From an economic intuition, these results indicate the importance of regulatory and 
institutional framework in Islamic microfinance development. However, it remains an open question 
for research and experimentation, whether regulatory and institutional indicators affect IMFIs 
performance and through which channels. As IMFIs differ from conventional MFIs in their activities 
types, clients’ specificities and their lending methodologies, they should use appropriate risk 
management instruments. Islamic micro-insurance (or micro takaful) can serve as an efficient loan 
protection when borrowers do not repay the loan for different purposes (like death or physical 
disability).  
Besides, social sanctions and religion ties may also serve as collateral for IMFIs to prevent borrowers 
from misuse of their provided loans. To defeat the problems of the lack of infrastructure for Islamic 
microfinance banks in rural districts and the higher operational costs, IMFIs could consider 
implementing Branchless Banking system which allow them to provide banking services with 
minimum expensive to the unbanked poor citizens living in rural districts. Our conclusions are 
consistent with previous findings of a study made by Mohieldin et al. (2012) based on the Doing 
Business Report 2012 and the Financial Access Report 2010, where they analyze the financial 
inclusion status of 37 OIC countries compared to other group of countries, namely GCC, OPEC and 
OECD. They point out that Islamic microfinance industry faces different difficulties including the 
absence of accounting standards, the lack of qualified working staff in Shariah rules, the disconnection 
of principles of Islamic finance with real economy, and the limited efforts made to attract potential 
Islamic clients. They show that 59% of microfinance institutions are under regulation with an  average 
level of 72% in low income countries, and  68% of OIC countries providing laws to impose 
confidentiality protection, whereas the average level reaches 78% in developing countries. They 
indicate that authorities in Muslim countries have to exploit the potential of Islamic instruments in 
order to enhance financial inclusion and to focus on improving their supervisory and regulatory 
systems and financial infrastructure to promote an enabling environment. Finally, we should stress that 
studying successful microfinance experiences does not necessarily mean to replicate the exact 
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experiences which are country specific a involving different factors including religious culture, 
clients’ needs and requirements, perspectives and willingness of the authorities to enhance the 
microfinance sector in their countries. Besides, prior to any decision the authority would make, the 
latter has to identify the purpose and interests of regulation, study the costs and the benefits, 
distinguish the enforcement instruments, and reconsider their priorities accordingly. 
REFERENCES 
 
 Abbink, K., B. Irlenbusch, and E. Renner. 2006. Interest rates in group lending:                         
A behavioural investigation. Pacific Economic Review, 11(2), 185–199.  
 Ahlin, C. and Townsend, R., 2003. Using repayment data to test across models of joint liability 
lending. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.  
 Ahlin, C., Lin, J., and  Maio. M., 2010. Where does microfinance flourish? Microfinance institution 
performance in macroeconomic context. Journal of Development Economics, 95, 105–120.  
 Ahmed, H., 2007. Waqf-based microfinance: Realizing the social role of Islamic finance. Paper 
presented at the International seminar on “Integrating Awqaf in the Islamic Financial Sector”, 
Singapore.  
 Armendariz de Aghion, B., and Gollier, C., 2000. Peer group formation in an adverse selection 
model. Economic Journal, 110, 632–643.  
 Armendariz de Aghion, B., and Morduch, J., 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. MIT Press, 
Cambridge/London.  
 Arun, T. G., and Turner, J., 2002. Financial sector reform: The Indian experience. The World 
Economy, 25, 3. 
  Ben Soltane, B., 2009. Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in Mediterranean 
countries, Journal of Business Economics and Management.  
 Banerjee, A.V., Besley, and T., Guinnane, T.W., 1994. Thy neighbor’s keeper: the design of a 
credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 491–515. 
 Besley, T. and Coates, S. (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. 
Journal of Development Economics, 46, 1–18.  
 Cason, T.N., Gangadharan, L. and Maitra, P., 2012. Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a 
laboratory microfinance experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 82, 192–209. 
 CGAP, 2013. Lessons learned from the Moroccan crisis. 
 Chapra, U., 1983. Monetary policy in an Islamic economy. Ziauddin Ahmad, et. al.(eds.), Money 
and Banking in Islam  (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies), 27–68. 
 Churchill, C., and Halpern, S., 2001. Building customer loyalty: A Practical guide for microfinance 
institutions. Microfinance Network, Washington, 22–39. 
 Dusuki. A.W., 2008. Banking for the poor: the role of Islamic banking in microfinance initiatives, 
Humanomics, 24 (1), 49 –66.  
 El-Zoghbi, M., and Tarazi, M., 2013.Trends in Shariah-compliant financial inclusion. CGAP, 
Focus Note  N°84. 
 Gale, D. and M. Hellwig. 1985. Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period 
problem. The Review of Economic Studies 52 (4), 647–663. 
 Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of Development 
Economics, 60, 27–50.  
 Ghatak, M., 2000. Screening by the company you keep: joint liability lending and the peer 
selection effect. Economic Journal, 110, 601–631. 
 Ghatak, M., and Guinnane, T.W., 1999. The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and 
practice, Journal of Development Economics, 60, 195–228.  
 Giné, X., and Karlan, D., 2006. .Group versus individual liability: evidence from a field experiment 
in the Philippines.Yale University Economic Growth Center working paper 940.  
 Giné, X., and Karlan., D., 2008. Peer monitoring and enforcement: Long term evidence from 
microcredit lending groups with and without group liability. Working Paper.  
29 
 
 Gómez, Rafael, and Eric Santor., 2003. Do peer group members outperform individual borrowers? 
A test of peer group lending using Canadian micro-credit data. Bank of Canada, Working Paper 
33, October.   
 Grönroos, C., 1990. Service management and marketing: Managing the moments of truth in service 
competition. Lexington, MA: D.C. Health Lexington Books. 
 Hassan MK., 2010. An Integrated Poverty Alleviation Model Combining Zakah, Awqaf and 
Microfinance, Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference “The Tawhidi 
Epistemology: Zakah and Awqaf Economy”, Bangi.  
 Hartarska, V., 2005. Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the newly independent States. World Development, 33 (10), 1627–1648.  
 Hartarska, V., Nadolnyak, D., 2007. Do regulated microfinance institutions achieve better 
sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence. Applied Economics, 39 (10), 1–16.  
 Iqbal, Z. and A. Mirakhor. 2007. An introduction to Islamic finance: Theory and practice. 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Asia.  
 Ismal, R., 2009. Assessing moral hazard problem in Murabahah financing. Working paper.  
 Kailley H.S., 2007. Microfinance in developing countries: the challenge of sustainable financial 
institutions, Master’s degree thesis, http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/dspace/bitstream/1892/10771/1/etd4435.pdf.  
 Kazem, S., 2007. Gharzul-Hasaneh financing and institutions. Paper presented at the “First 
International Conference on Inclusive Islamic Financial Sector Development”. Negara Brunei 
Darussalam.  
 Karim, N., Tarazi, M., and Reille, X., 2008. Islamic microfinance: an emerging market niche, 
CGAP, Focus Note. N°49.  
 Khan, A. A., 2008. Islamic microfinance: Theory, policy and practices. Islamic Relief Worldwide, 
Birmingham, UK. 
 Kotler, P., Littlefield, E., Morduch, J., and Hashemi, S., 2003. Is microfinance an effective strategy 
to reach the millennium development goals?. CGAP Focus Note.  
 Laffont, J. J., and Rey P., 2003. Moral hazard, collusion and group lending. IDEI Working Paper, 
N°122, University of Toulouse 1.  
 Ledgerwood, J., and White, J., 2006. Transforming microfinance institutions: providing full 
financial services to the poor, The World Bank.  
 Macchiavello, E., 2012. Microfinance regulation and supervision: A multi-faced prism of 
structures, levels and issues. NY Journal of Law & Business, 9, 125–197.  
 Mersland, R. and Strøm, R.O., 2009. Performance and governance in microfinance institutions. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 662–669.  
 Mohieldin, M., Iqbal, Z., Rostom, A., and Fu, X. 2012. The role of Islamic finance in enhancing 
financial inclusion in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. Islamic Economic 
Studies, 20(2), 55–120.  
 Nabi, M.S. 2013. Access to Finance and Investment: Does Profit Sharing Dominate Debt?, IRTI 
Working Paper No. 1434-02. 
 Natarajan, K., 2004. Can group lending overcome adverse selection problems?. Working paper. 
Centre for Financial and Management Studies, University of London.  
 Obaidullah, M., and Khan, T., 2008. Islamic microfinance development: Challenges and initiatives. 
Policy dialogue paper N°2, Islamic Research and Training Institute, IDB.  
 Pickens, M., Porteous, D., and Rotman, S., 2009. Banking the poor through G2P payments, Focus 
Note CGAP and DFID.  
 Rai, A., and Sjöström, T., 2004. Is Grameen lending efficient? Repayment incentives and insurance 
in village economies. Review of Economic Studies,71 (1), 217–234.  
 Rai, A., and Sjöström, T., 2010. Redesigning microfinance. Working paper.  
 Rhyne, 2002. The experience of microfinance institutions with regulation and supervision. 
Discussion paper presented at “The 5th International Forum on Microentreprise”, Rio de Janeiro.  
 Sharma, M. and Zeller, M., 1997. Repayment performance in group-based credit programs in 
Bangldesh: an empirical analysis, World Development, 25(10), 1731–42.  
30 
 
 Sousa-Shields, M., and Miamidian, E., 2004. Financing microfinance institutions: The context for 
transitions to private capital.  
 Steel, W. F., & Andah, D. O. (2003). Rural and microfinance regulation in Ghana: Implications 
for development and performance of the industry (World Bank Africa Regional Working Paper 
Series No. 49). Washington, DC.  
 Stiglitz, E.J., 1990. Peer monitoring and credit markets. The World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 
351–366.  
 Stiglitz, J. E., 1994. The role of the state in financial markets. Proceedings of the World Bank 
Annual Conference on Development Economics 1993, 19–52.  
 Theodore, L., & Loubiere, T., 2002. The experience of microfinance institutions with regulation 
and supervision: Perspectives from practitioners and a supervisor. In D. Deborah & R. Elisabeth 
(Eds), The commercialization of microfinance: Balancing business and development. Kumarian 
Press.  
 Varian, H.R., 1990. Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 146, 153–174.  
 Wydick, B., 2001. Group lending under dynamic incentives as a borrower discipline device, 
Review of Development Economics, 5(3), 406–20.  
 Yunus, Muhammad. 2002. Grameen Bank II: Designed to open new possibilities. Dhaka: Grameen 
Bank. www.grameen-info.org/bank/bank2.html.  
 Yousfi, O., 2012. Do PLS financing methods solve asymmetric information?.Working Paper. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025077.  
 
Appendix 1 
In order to best understand the concept of Islamic Microfinance, pre-discuss the logic of Islamic 
Finance and its products is needed. The famous principal, on which the overall Islamic Finance system 
is based, is the prohibition of “Riba” (“usury” or “interest”). The belief behind the interdiction is that 
money should not be seen or dealt with as an earning asset in itself, and, therefore it cannot be created 
through the credit system. Money is, rather, a medium of exchange. Time value of money is not taking 
into consideration in regular Islamic banking transactions, unless money is used in investments (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 1997). Other principals are the prohibition of Gharar (“uncertainty”), Dharar 
(“harmful substance”) and Maysir (“gumbling”).  
Islamic finance is set to serve social interests, enhance asset-based productive economic activities, and 
offer alternatives for “non-ethical” financial products where gambling and speculation are 
predominant. It distinguishes between three types of financial allocation: Equity-based financing, 
Debt-based financing, and Benevolent loan. Equity-based financing is a contract between two parties 
which aims to finance income-generating activities under Shariah principles. It includes Musharakah 
(“joint venture”), Mudarabah (“trustee partnership” or “profit sharing”), Musaqat (“plantation 
management fee based on certain portion of yield”), and Muzara’ah (“harvest yield profit sharing”) 
contracts. Debt-based financing is a contract that engages its parties to buy and sell specific goods 
based on Shariah principles. It includes different kinds of contracts such as Murabahah (“cost-plus” or 
“mark-up sale”), Ijara (“leasing”), Istisna’ (“commission to manufacturer” or “manufacture sale”), 
Bay’ Salam (“forward sale” or “differed delivery sale”). Finally, Benevolent loan (Qard hasan) is a 
loan offered by lenders to those who need it, namely weak and needy people, small farmers or 
producers, or micro entrepreneur who cannot get access to regular banking institutions). In such loan, 
borrowers are expected to repay only the principle, plus the administrative costs inherent to the loan.  
Murabahah is the most widely used Islamic microfinance products, with 672,000 active clients and a 
total asset portfolio of about US$413 million across 255 Islamic microfinance providers (El-Zoghbi 
and Tarazi, 2013). Both lenders and borrowers often used it because it performs lower risk compared 
to other financing schemes. Adopting products based on Murabahah and Ijara reduce IMFIs’ risk and 
enhance their profitability as these contracts involve real transactions by exchanging goods/assets 
rather than lending money (Ahmed, 2007).  
Appendix 2.A  
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Table 1.  MFIs Data Descriptions 
Categories and Indicators Rating Description 
Overall Score 0-100 The overall score is the weighted mean of the 
category scores reduced by the adjustment 
factor. 
Regulatory Framework and Practices 0-100 It is measured as the weighted sum of 
indicators in the category 
Regulation and supervision of microcredit portfolios 0-4 (4=best) It measures to which extent regulations and 
supervisions in the country help different 
financial institutions provide microcredit 
product.      
Formation of regulated/supervised microcredit 
institutions 
0-4 (4=best) It measures whether regulations encourage the 
formation of new MFIs, including Greenfield 
MFIs, up scaling NGOs and other type.  
Formation/operation of non-regulated microcredit 
institutions 
0-4 (4=best) It measures whether the legislative system 
encourage the formation and well functioning 
of non- regulated MFIs  
Regulatory and supervision capacity for microfinance 0-4 (4=best) It is measured as the weighted sum of 
indicators in the category 
Regulatory framework for deposit-taking 0-4 (4=best) It measures whether non-regulated MFIs take 
deposits from public or not. 
Supporting Institutional Framework  0-100 It is measured as the weighted sum of 
indicators in the category 
Accounting transparency 0-4 (4=best) It measures whether standards of accounting 
at MFIs in line with international norms, and 
whether institutions are required to undergo 
regular audits and to publish financial 
statements? 
Transparency in pricing 0-4 (4=best) It verifies if the regulatory system protects 
microfinance borrowers by requiring 
transparency on interest rates and whether 
institutions (both regulated and non-regulated) 
follow these practices 
Dispute resolution 0-4 (4=best) It verifies whether the regulatory environment 
provide timely dispute resolution at 
reasonable cost in the event of disagreements 
between microfinance lenders and borrowers 
Credit bureaus 0-4 (4=best) It verifies how effective and reliable are credit 
bureaus for microfinance 
Policy and practice for financial transactions through 
agents 
0-4 (4=best) It verifies if regulations and technology in 
places that allow innovations in microfinance, 
such as mobile-phone transactions and POS 
options 
Adjustment Factor: Stability 0-100 It is measured as the weighted sum of 
indicators in the category 
Political shock to microfinance 0-2 (0=best) It determines the potential impact of political 
shocks or weak governance on the 
Microfinance environment. 
Political stability 0-100 
(0=best) 
It assesses political climate in the country, 
including social unrest, opposition stance, 
excessive authority and international tension 
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Appendix 2.B  
Table 3. Summary of the Bangladeshi Islamic microfinance experience  
 
Institution Program Activities Islamic mode of 
financing 
Outreach Performance indicators 
Islamic Bank 
Bangladesh Limited 
(IBBL) 
Rural Development 
Scheme (RDS)  
- Development microfinance in 
rural areas  
- Help poor people achieving 
economic self-sufficiency  
- Empowering rural women  
- Improve the standard of living 
- Imparting education, developing 
morality 
- Ensure healthcare and health 
awareness 
Bay’ Mu’jjal, Bay’ 
Murabahah, Bay’ 
Salam 
The bank serves 67% of 
clients using Shariah-
compliant microfinance 
products in the country 
Loan recovery rate equals 
99.16% 
Social Investment 
Bank Ltd (SIB) 
Family 
Empowerment 
Micro Enterprise 
Program (FEMEP) 
and SME programs 
- Assist the low-income people to 
improve their standards of living 
by purchasing necessary materials 
commodities for their businesses 
- Develop social investment 
projects 
 
 
Waqf and Mosque 
properties, cash Waqf 
certificate, joint 
venture projects for 
management of Hajj 
affairs 
- For FEMEP program, the 
total outstanding portfolio 
rises to US$0.3million in 2005 
- For the SME program, the 
total outstanding portfolio 
rises to US$1.1million 
Loan recovery rates: 96% 
(FEMEP) and 94% (SME 
program) 
 
 
Al-Fallah Aam 
Unnayan Sangstha 
(AFAUS) 
 - Achieve a sound and good 
environment for peaceful and 
happy livelihood 
- Mobilize available local 
resources to assist the 
marginalized people in rural and 
urban areas living below the 
poverty line, such as distressed, 
landless, and marginal farmers 
Bay’ Mu’jjal (74.4%) The total number of 
beneficiaries rises to 6,793 
- ROA=0.49  
-  Net Interest Margin 
(NIM)=19.5 
-  Operating Costs as a % 
of Loan Disbursed 
(OCL)=9.6 
 
 
  
Sources: Mohieldin et al. (2012) and Ahmed (2002) 
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Appendix 2.C 
Table 4. Regulatory and supervisory frameworks of countries with successful microfinance experiences  
Countries 
Legal Status 
of MFIs 
Regulatory and supervision System Transparency 
Dispute Resolution 
Acts of Law 
Supervisory and 
Regulatory 
Institution 
Regulatory system 
(Capital & Reserve) 
Transparency in 
Prices 
Accounting 
Transparency 
Pakistan Conventional 
Commercial 
Banks 
Microfinance 
Institutions Ordinance 
Act , 2001;  Banking 
Companies Ordinance, 
1962, Prudential 
Regulations for 
Microfinance 
Banks/Institutions, 2002 
All MF Banks operate 
under the direct 
supervision of the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 
while no supervision on 
other MFIs 
 
The Islamic Microfinance 
Division of the Bank shall 
be required to maintain a 
minimum fund of Rs 10 
million or 15% of the risk 
weighted assets of Islamic 
microfinance  
 
The minimum capital 
requirement is defined 
according to the area of 
operation of the MFI. 
Pakistan distinguishes 
between MFIs operating 
in a specified district, in a 
specified province and 
nationwide, with the last 
category requiring the 
highest capital amount. In 
Indonesia, the distinction 
is not based on 
geographical size.  
 
The minimum capital 
requirement for MF 
Banks operating district-
wide is PKR300m, while 
PKR500m for MFBs 
operating in a province. 
For country-wide MFBs, 
the maximum capital 
The SBP requires that all 
Microfinance Banks 
should give their potential 
clients all the information 
needed about prices, 
interest fees, and terms and 
conditions of the contracts.  
Except small NGOs, formal and 
informal MFIs are required to 
submit to an external audit and 
publicly publish an annual. To 
supervise deposit-taking MFBs, 
the SBP oblige these 
institutions to follow prudential 
regulations.   
 
Dealing with client complaints, 
the SBP issued in 2004 a new 
circular requires MFIs to 
institutionalize a procedure for 
MFBs must reply in a courteous 
manner within 10 days and 
must take corrective action 
toward issues that are recurring.  
Islamic MFIs 
(Islamic 
Microfinance 
Banks (IMFBs); 
Islamic 
Microfinance 
Services by 
Islamic Banks; 
Islamic 
Microfinance 
Services by 
Conventional 
Banks; and 
Islamic 
Microfinance 
Services by 
Conventional 
Microfinance 
Banks (MFBs)) 
 
Microfinance 
Institutions Ordinance 
Act, 2001; SMED 
Circular N° 10/2006;   
SMED Circular N° 
11/2006;  Circular N° 
05/2007; Banking 
Companies Ordinance, 
1962,  Prudential 
Regulations for 
Microfinance 
Banks/Institutions, 2002 
Specialized 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
Companies Ordinance, 
1984 Section 42 (non‐
profit) ;  Society Act 
1860 ;  Trust Act 1882 
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Rural Support 
Programs running 
microfinance 
operation as part 
of multi‐
dimensional 
program 
Companies Ordinance, 
1984 Section 42;   
Society Act 1860 
 requirement is PKR1bn.                     
Multi‐Sectoral 
NGOs 
Society Act 1860; 
Social Welfare 1961 ;  
BCO, 1962;  
Companies Ordinance, 
1984‐NBFC 
Indonesia Commercial 
Banks 
Banking Act N° 7/1992 
+ amendment N° 
10/1998 
Bank Indonesia (BI)/ The 
Financial Services 
Authority (Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan—OJK) (a new 
regulatory authority 
approved by parliament in 
October 2011) 
The BI supervise Banks 
using a Capital, Assets 
quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity 
(CAMEL) rating system, 
comprising seven ratios 
and 25 questions  
Besides, Commercial 
Banks are subject to Basel 
regulations: The capital 
adequacy ratio is set at a 
minimum of 8% of 
productive assets and the 
minimum capital 
requirement is Rp3trillion  
The BI requires 
commercial banks to 
quarterly publish clear 
information to customers 
on interest rates and terms 
of loans. However, this 
information is not required 
to be published in 
centralized website. Banks 
are free to decide where 
they publish it. 
  
 
 
In an attempt to get benefit 
from the best aspects of each 
system, Indonesia’s accounting 
standards are a mixture of three 
accounting systems: IAS, US 
GAAP and Uniform 
Accounting Plans. All 
commercial banks have to 
comply with Basel II 
regulations. 
Reports on settlement of 
clients’ complaints should be 
submitted on quarterly basis. 
The judiciary system is yet 
inefficient. On average, 
enforcing a contract takes 570 
days. Rural Banks The capital adequacy ratio 
is fixed at 8% while 15% 
for opening new branch. 
The Capital Requirements 
vary by location: Rp5 
billion in Jakarta and 
Rp500m in areas outside 
Jakarta and vicinities, and 
outside capital cities of 
provinces in Java and Bali 
Rural banks and co-
operatives do not face 
requirements on interest 
rate transparency. In their 
communication with 
customers cooperatives 
and rural banks typically 
state their rates on a 
monthly flat basis. Small and Large 
Cooperatives 
Cooperative Law N° 
25/1992 and 
Government Regulation 
All types of Cooperatives 
are under regulation of 
State Ministry of 
The capital adequacy ratio 
is 4% of risk-weighted 
assets. 
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(PP) N° 9/1995 Cooperatives and SME, 
and are subject to 
supervision of district 
government office dealing 
with Cooperatives. 
The capital requirement is  
Paid-up capital: Rp15 
million for primary 
cooperative, while Rp50 
million for secondary 
cooperative 
Islamic 
Cooperatives/Cre
dit Unions 
Cooperative Law N° 
25/1992; 
PP N° 9/1995, 
Presidential Instruction 
N° 18/1998 
NGOs/MFIs Deposit taking NGOs 
must adhere to 
Banking Act N° 7/1992 
or Cooperative Law N° 
25/1992. Besides, they 
should follow 
Foundation (Yayasan) 
Law 
Ministry of 
Justice/Provincial 
Development Bank 
No Capital adequacy ratio 
and No minimum capital 
requirement  
 
Uganda Tier 1 institutions: 
Commercial 
Banks 
(Companies) 
The Financial 
Institutions Statute, 
1993; Revised Statutes, 
2003;  Financial 
Institutions Act, 2004   
The Bank of Uganda 
(BoU) 
MDIs require a minimum 
capital of about USh25bn 
for a commercial bank, 
UShbn for a credit 
institution and USh500m 
for MDI 
 
 
The capital adequacy 
requirement for MDI 
should not be less than 
15% of core capital and 
20% of total capital as 
compared to 12% for 
banks and credit 
institutions. 
According to the MDI Act 
N°5/2003,   MFIs must 
disclose regularly financial 
statements on interest rates 
and performance status of 
all their loans. 
All regulated MFIs, including 
NGOs, are required to follow 
IFRS standards in their 
reporting. 
 
Financial statements must be 
audited and published annually 
in a Ugandan newspaper, and 
they must be displayed in each 
MDI office and branch. 
Besides, at least each quarter of 
the year, external auditors 
should review the MDI weekly 
and monthly returns. 
Complaint resolution 
mechanisms are weak and 
inefficient. However, relevant 
steps were moving towards 
developing and enhancing this 
field. Two main institutions 
were actively present in Uganda 
to achieve that goal: The 
Uganda Consumer’ Protection 
Association (UPCA) and the 
Consumer Education Trust 
(CONSENT) organization. 
They work to provide education 
and sensitization to clients and 
to defeat their rights.  
Tier 2 institutions: 
Credit institutions 
(Companies) 
Tier 3 institutions: 
Deposit-taking 
institutions(Comp
anies limited by 
shares) 
The Uganda micro 
finance deposit-taking 
institutions (MDI) Act, 
2003; Financial 
Institutions Act, 2004   
 
Tier 4 institutions 
include Non 
deposit-taking 
institutions, 
SACCOs and 
NGOs 
The Cooperative 
Societies Regulations, 
1992 
The National Board of 
Non-Governmental 
Organizations at the 
ministry of internal 
affairs. 
No minimum capital 
requirements 
  
Morocco Commercial 
Banks 
Banking Law  N° 34-03 Banque AL-Maghrib 
(BAM, the Central Bank) 
/ Ministry of Finance 
The minimum capital 
requirement for banks is 
Dh200mn (US$22.5). 
To this date, there is no 
specific regulatory system 
protecting microfinance 
borrowers in term of prices 
transparency 
MFIs are required to submit 
information on their outreach, 
sources of funding, and on their 
financial statements to BAM 
and to the Ministry of Finance 
on a quarterly basis. Indeed, 
There is no efficient mechanism 
for complaint resolution in term 
of time and costs 
Cooperatives/Cre
dit Unions 
Cooperative Law N° 
24-83, 1984 + 
amendment 1993 
Federation of Microcredit 
Associations 
Lending institutions have 
a minimum capital 
requirement ranging 
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Sources: Global Microscope on Microfinance Business Environment (2012); Prudential Regulations for Microfinance Banks/Institutions (2002), The State ate Bank of Pakistan website; BoU 
website; Allaire et al. 2009; Reille and Lyman (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGOs/MFIs Law Regulation 
Associations (Dahir 
Law, 1958) + 
Microcredit Law N° 18-
97, 1999, 2004; N° 04-
07, 2007, amendment 
N° 53-10, 2011 + 
Banking Law  N° 34-03 
(supervision) + Bank 
AL Maghrib’s 
regulation 
 between Dh1mn 
(US$110,000) and 
Dh50mn (US$5.6) 
depending on the nature 
of the activity 
BAM requires MFIs to report 
and submit an annual report on 
internal control.  Since 2008, 
Moroccan banks’ financial 
statements are prepared and 
audited in accordance with the 
IFRS standards, but are not yet 
fully compliant with it. 
In 2009, the “Direction de 
Supervision Bancaire”of BAM 
required all MFIs must comply 
with new  non-performing loans  
provision standards as of  Law 
N° 53-10 
Bank al Barid 
(Postal Bank) 
Law on Post N° 24-96 Banque AL-Maghrib/ 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Microfinance 
Companies 
(MFCs) 
Law on Microfinance 
Organizations N° 
124/2002;  2005 and 
2009 amendments to 
Law N°124/2002 on 
Microfinance 
Organizations 
The central bank (NBKR) MFCs are subject to 
prudential requirements 
Since 2008, the NBKR 
required that banks and 
non-banks to publish both 
effective and nominal rates 
whenever the nominal rate 
is quoted. 
All MFIs’ types are required to 
conduct their operations in line 
with IFRS accounting 
standards. Specifically, at least 
once a quarter, an MFC must 
publish in local newspapers 
balance reporting with 
explanations on this reporting 
and its financial statements 
annually as confirmed by an 
independent external auditor. 
Dispute resolution system is 
considered as weak. Different 
parties (MFI and a client) 
recource to peaceful resolution 
instead of judicial procedure  
Microcredit 
Companies 
(MCCs) 
 
MCCs and MCAs are not 
subject to capital 
adequacy requirements 
Microcredit 
Agencies 
(MCAs), 
Commercial 
Banks and Credit 
Unions 
 
